fairblock mev

The x/fairblock module implements QoreChain's defense against Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks using threshold identity-based encryption. Combined with a 5-lane transaction prioritization system, this creates a comprehensive anti-MEV architecture that protects users from front-running, sandwich attacks, and other forms of mempool-based value extraction.

The MEV Problem

MEV occurs when block proposers or observers exploit information asymmetry in the transaction mempool. Because pending transactions are visible before inclusion, adversaries can:

  • Front-run: Place a transaction ahead of a detected profitable trade

  • Sandwich attack: Place transactions before and after a victim's trade to extract value from price slippage

  • Back-run: Place a transaction immediately after a detected opportunity

These attacks extract value from ordinary users and undermine fairness in DeFi, token swaps, and NFT minting.

FairBlock tIBE Framework

QoreChain addresses MEV through threshold Identity-Based Encryption (tIBE), a cryptographic scheme where:

  1. Encryption: Users encrypt their transactions before broadcasting. Encrypted transactions are opaque -- proposers, validators, and mempool observers cannot read transaction contents.

  2. Inclusion: Proposers include encrypted transactions in blocks without knowing their contents. Since the data is unreadable, information asymmetry is eliminated.

  3. Decryption: After a transaction is committed to a block, a threshold number of validators contribute decryption shares. Once the threshold is met, the transaction is decrypted and executed.

This approach ensures that no single party can decrypt a transaction before it is irreversibly committed, eliminating the MEV attack vector at its root.

Encrypted Transaction Structure

Each encrypted transaction contains:

Field
Description

encrypted_data

tIBE-encrypted transaction payload

sender

Transaction sender address (visible for routing)

target_height

Block height at which decryption should occur

submitted_at

Timestamp of encryption

Decryption Shares

Validators contribute decryption shares for committed transactions:

Field
Description

validator

Address of the contributing validator

tx_id

ID of the encrypted transaction

share_data

The validator's decryption key share

height

Block height of the share submission

Implementation Status (v1.2.0)

In the current testnet release, the FairBlock module is a stub implementation:

  • The FairBlockDecorator ante handler is wired into the transaction processing pipeline but passes through all transactions without modification.

  • When enabled is false (the default), the decorator immediately delegates to the next handler in the chain.

  • Full tIBE activation is planned for a future release, pending a validator key ceremony to establish the threshold encryption parameters.

FairBlock Configuration

Parameter
Default
Description

enabled

false

Master switch for tIBE encryption

tibe_threshold

5

Number of validator decryption shares required

decryption_delay

3 blocks

Blocks after inclusion before decryption begins

max_encrypted_size

65,536 bytes

Maximum size of an encrypted transaction payload

5-Lane Transaction Prioritization

QoreChain implements a 5-lane mempool architecture that categorizes transactions by type and assigns each lane a priority level and block space allocation.

Lane Configuration

Lane
Priority
Block Space
Transaction Type

PQC

100 (highest)

15%

Transactions with post-quantum hybrid signatures

MEV

90

20%

FairBlock tIBE-encrypted transactions

AI

80

15%

AI-scored and fee-optimized transactions

Default

50

40%

Standard transactions

Free

10 (lowest)

10%

Gas-abstracted and sponsored transactions

Lane Descriptions

PQC Lane (Priority 100, 15% block space) Transactions signed with hybrid post-quantum cryptographic signatures receive the highest priority. This incentivizes adoption of quantum-safe transaction signing and ensures PQC-protected operations are never crowded out during congestion.

MEV Lane (Priority 90, 20% block space) tIBE-encrypted transactions receive the second-highest priority and the largest reserved allocation. This ensures that users who opt into MEV protection are guaranteed block space, encouraging widespread adoption of the encryption scheme.

AI Lane (Priority 80, 15% block space) Transactions that have been scored or optimized by the AI anomaly detection system receive elevated priority. This includes transactions flagged as high-value legitimate operations or those with AI-optimized fee structures.

Default Lane (Priority 50, 40% block space) Standard transactions without any special classification. This lane receives the largest absolute block space allocation to handle normal network traffic.

Free Lane (Priority 10, 10% block space) Gas-abstracted and sponsored transactions. This lane enables zero-fee user experiences where a third party (application, protocol, or relayer) sponsors the gas cost. The low priority and limited block space prevent abuse while still supporting gas abstraction use cases.

Implementation Status

Lane configuration is data-only in v1.2.0. The lane definitions (priority, block space allocation) are registered at application initialization, but actual mempool reordering via PrepareProposal and ProcessProposal is a future milestone. Currently, all transactions are processed in standard order regardless of lane assignment.

Combined Anti-MEV Effect

1

Layer 1: Encryption (tIBE)

Transactions are encrypted before entering the mempool. Proposers cannot read contents → no information to extract.

2

Layer 2: Prioritization (Lanes)

Encrypted MEV-lane transactions get 20% reserved block space. Priority 90 ensures inclusion even during congestion.

3

Layer 3: Threshold Decryption

Only after block commitment do validators reveal decryption shares. Threshold requirement prevents any single validator from early decryption.

Result: Information asymmetry is eliminated at every stage of the transaction lifecycle, from broadcast to execution.

This approach is strictly superior to time-delayed decryption or single-party commit-reveal schemes, because the threshold requirement distributes trust across the validator set.